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THOUGHTS ABOUT PROFESSOR RESNIK'S PAPER
PATRICKE. I-IGGINBOTHAMt
Professor Resnik offers a compelling description of the problems
of aggregating cases and compensating attorneys engaged in their
resolution.! Her responses are creative and offer fresh insights into
this heavily-plowed terrain. Ultimately, in her redefinition of roles for
judges and lawyers, she depends upon increased judicial regulation
and oversight of attorneys. Rather than such a redefinition of roles, I
prefer to accent structural changes calculated to achieve similar results by invoking attorneys' self-interest, and changes with less policing, albeit more than now exists.
In Part I, I caution against charging aggregation with problems
that it exposes but does not create. In Part I, I turn to the specific
recommendations of the paper.

I
Legislative use of private attorneys general to enforce set norms
has long been a familiar part of American government. This use of
private litigation as a tool of governance is justified as a powerful
means of both compensating victims and achieving regulatory compliance. Yet these twin justifications are in tension because compensation costs have no internal tether to an optimal level of costs for regulatory compliance. They are related only in a rough, serendipitous
way. The costs of compensating victims may be insufficient to effectuate regulatory compliance or so large as to overwhelm. It is pure hap-penstance if compensation and regulatory force balance out. With
traditional bipolar sequential case resolution, the risk is underregulation: a gap opens between the costs of the cases and the cost levels es-
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sential to the regulatory objective. Put another way, the system assumes the underprosecution of losses. Aggregation of cases exposes
this lack of fit between costs of compensating victims and tolerable
regulatory costs.
At the same time, undercompensation is not inevitably an imperfection. Regulatory goals might be frustrated by full compensation of
all "victims." Note that the term "victim" derives its meaning from the
norm to be enforced. Additionally, the perceived unfairness in leaving "victims" undercompensated may be ignoring the circumstance
that victim status is a derivative of the norm. There is a "victim" because in proscribing conduct, a statutory scheme may create a "right"
to be free of the effects of the forbidden conduct. Enforcement of
norms that sweep too broadly tend to identify "victims" with little connection to the policy in play.
Private attorneys general have remained important players in enforcing policy despite the often ill-defined concept of "victim." Their
usefulness in the many cases in which a rule has defined a "victim" too
broadly is protected in part by the reality that the traditional model of
episodic, sequentially-filed suits ordinarily does not generate claims by
all "victims." When the decision to sue rests on the initiative of the
"victim," many will not sue. And any unfairness of the unevenness in
the awards across cases is masked.
Aggregation exposes these realities. It reveals an overly broad
scope of "victims" because its efficiency in gathering claims results in
fuller prosecution, possibly threatening the existence of regulated entities. Aggregation exposes inequities in recoveries across cases, creating pressure to shore up the unevenness inherent in open-ended
norms. We see this result reflected in the now-familiar move from
agreed specific settlement amounts to negotiated processes creating
claims systems with grids and other devices-not unlike the Sentencing Guidelines. In short, many of our complaints with aggregation are
difficulties that aggregation exposes but does not create.

The popularity of private litigation, particularly damage suits, as a
tool for enforcing legislative policies has been sustained in part by the
assumption of underenforcement. A higher level of enforcement of
such policies raises the question of whether Congress intended that
2 Punitive damages and other awards for more intangible losses tend to fill this gap
in an equally random fashion.
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result. When a change to Rule 23 is read to facilitate large aggregations, for example, it provokes assertions that the change in the proposal is substantive and outside of the Enabling Act. Indeed, a change
to Rule 23 that would discourage large classes of very small claims
provokes the same assertion.
To my eyes, the culprit here is the absence of a clear statement of
legislative policy. The level of enforcement is part of the package of
policy choices that ought to attend the legislation. We might take a
page from the recent spate of federalism disputes: a judicial insistence upon a clear statement from Congress as a condition to aggregation. Against the backdrop of our trans-substantive rules of procedure, Congress ought to decide whether to limit aggregation by caps
or other devices when those procedural rules would engender a level
of enforcement never intended by Congress. In short, whether and
why large numbers of cases should be aggregated ought to be a considered choice reflecting its powerful substantive consequences.
One other seemingly independent legal development ought not
be ignored. The bottom line, so far, of the Seminole Tribe, City of
Boerru,4 and Alden v. Maind cases is that Congress cannot enforce its
norms against States through the use of private damage suits. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court has ensured the vitality of Ex Parte
Young,6 and specifically the availability of prospective injunctive relief.
This leaves the enforcement of federal norms against States to suits by
the United States or to the tailored injunctions of private suits. States
have been freed from the bludgeon but remain under the more surgical and tailored control of injunctions. 7 That this retreat from the
damage remedy for private attorneys general is the product of distinct
doctrinal forces does not lessen the attractiveness of increased reliance upon injunctive relief for all aggregated cases. We may see
greater emphasis upon equitable remedies such as disgorgement and
prospective relief. Such a move would shift the focus to the problems
aggregation actually creates and away from the problems it only exposes. Perversely, however, prospective injunctive relief may have the
least play with aggregated tort claims whose remedies inherently resist

3 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
4 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
- 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
6

209 U.S. 123 (1908).

Relatedly, the use of surrogates is being challenged. Qui tam plaintiffs may not
escape the state immunities from damage liability. Even the use of the bounty, as old
as the Republic, is being challenged.
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consistent treatment across cases.
Class actions are only part of the phenomenon of aggregated
cases. After Ortiz' and Amcheng9 they may play an even smaller role.
Class certification under Rule 23(b) (3), where most damage suits will
fall, may be most attractive when the lawyer has a contractual relationship with only a few of the victims. This lack of clients means that the
lawyer needs both the opt-out requirements of the rule to round them
up and the preclusive effects of ajudgment The first is obvious. The
second is almost as apparent-the lawyer is selling preclusion to the
defendants, who often are aggressive shoppers.
The settlement of cases in which there is a contractual relationship between the plaintiffs' counsel and each victim may proceed on
an aggregate rather than an individual basis. Despite the absence of
need to gather clients, plaintiffs' counsel can offer releases and even
individual judgments. This is the large grey market of group settlements that is largely ignored. Indeed, the decisions in Ortiz and
Amchem have cast a surrealistic shadow in that they proceed as if the
class device is the only engine of settlement on an aggregate basis.
That is a mistake made by rulemakers as well.
With both asbestos and tobacco cases, the practical control of
large numbers of cases is concentrated in a few law firms. There is
nothing clandestine or inherently sinister about these concentrations.
They are predictable consequences of a free market. The gathering is
by referrals of local lawyers. These firms have developed considerable
information about defendants and about the science of the cases.
This repository of expertise is expensive to acquire and has considerable value. Lawyers with a handful of cases see the economy of scale
obtainable by referring the cases. The specialist accepts the obligations of developing a theory of liability and locating the proper defendants. The referring attorney can maintain the client contact, often assisting in developing the client history. Significantly, this
aggregating of cases requires no transfer. The case need never leave
its local place of filing. Settlements are negotiated for thousands of
these cases on an aggregate basis-with distribution to each client according to a negotiated sum or formula. These settlements proceed
with little or no judicial supervision of counsel. Rather, there is an assumption that the presence of a direct attorney-client relationship
creates a private settlement. There can be problems with these set-

8Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).

" Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 581 (1997).
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tlements that look much like problems attending the settlement of
class actions. Yet the differences remain large in relevant ways, and
they fall into a remarkably unregulated zone largely ignored by critics
of the class device.
The dynamics of settlement between these two types of aggregated
cases differ at bottom. There is an attorney-client relationship with
each victim, however attenuated in fact, in one set and not in the
other. Few of the cases can be tried on an aggregated basis, and putting those cases aside, the whole issue is one of settlement. It is assumed that without an attorney-client relationship, the judiciary is required to superintend. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently observed in
deciding a dispute over attorneys fees:
The supervisory power of the district court affords a mechanism for assuring loyal performance of the attorneys' fiduciary duty to the
class... [b]ecause the district court had the authority and duty to pass
upon the fairness of the attorneys' fees settlement independently of
whether there was objection, [and] we need not decide whether the objector had standing.

just as Professor Resnik urges ought to happen, the court offered
itself as a cure for the absence of a private attorney with an attorneyclient relationship with a victim, whose compensation is being reduced to pay the lawyers she did not hire.
All of this cautions that a constant vigil is required in this fieldever watchful for the real culprits and ever seeking to know what's
really going on. I turn to the questions of managing costs with
aggregated cases.

According to Resnik, aggregate litigation is a good thing, whether
in the form of class actions, MDLs, bankruptcy, or other informal
groupings. Such litigation (1) allows courts to handle a greater number of disputes at decreased unit cost," (2) enables less injured parties
to seek redress who otherwise might not be able to, 2 and (3) increases

"inter-litigant equity" by standardizing results for similarly situated
plaintiffs.1 3
10Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1327-29 (9th Cir. 1999).
" See Resnik, supra note 1, at 2149 (noting that concerns about "waste and inefficiency" led to the enactment of the MDL statute).
" See i at 2146-47.
's Id. at Part MI.C.
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Along with such possible advantages, the growth of aggregate litigation has also resulted in the problem of how to compensate attorneys properly who conduct such litigation. To Professor Resnik, this is
an important question because aggregate litigation is a kind of public
subsidy.1 4 The compensation of attorneys directly affects how that
subsidy works in practice. At the moment, the payment of attorneys'
fees in class actions is largely unregulated. In Resnik's view, because
judges authorize these payments, judges are the allocators and purchasers of legal services who affect how the public subsidy of aggregate
litigation functions. 5 Historically, judges have been hesitant to make
substantive decisions in this field. More generally, the Court has also
said that judges should not be the ones making decisions as to which
types of cases are deserving of subsidized treatment 16 Recently, however, in Amchem and Oytiz, the Court has stated that judges must pay
for "process" in order to have legitimate mass tort settlements.
Professor Resnik's main conclusion is that the very nature of aggregate litigation creates a situation in which the compensation of attorneys must be regulated. A primary reason for this is the shifting alliances which occur, for example, in the context of mass tort cases, in
which parties change their alignments at various stages of litigation.
Moreover, by its very nature, aggregate litigation results in the vast majority of plaintiffs never taking an active part in the litigation. As such,
their interests can be shortchanged. Professor Resnik concludes that
in the context of aggregate settlements,1 7"consent by... lawyers no
longer suffices as a proxy for legitimacy."
She believes that there is little way around this problem without
some new forms of regulation and disclosure. Some of her potential
proposals include the following: (1) require court disclosure of all
agreements in which attorneys representing different subclasses agree
"on the side" to make payments which are not part of the settlement;18
14

See id at 2146-47 (discussing how the class action mechanism provides incentives

to lawyers who represent small or poor daimants).
15 See id. at 2127-29.
16 Compare Resnik's comment:
Return also to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Widerness Society and the Court's
ruling that judges should not select categories of cases for which to require
subsidies. My argument is that these premises have been overruled in practice
because aggregate litigation unavoidably puts judges into such a position,
[and] that judges cannot ignore these consequences of the aggregates they
participate in creating....
I& at 2163.
17 Id. at2169.
'8 See id at 2185.
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(2) employ public attorneys to aid judges in assessing the fairness of
proposed settlements and other inquiries which at this time fall on the
litigants to prove; 19 (3) charge the costs of this extra process against
the plaintiffs or the public, all of whom benefit from the use of aggregate litigation;20 (4) establish public agencies to help deal with
claims;, or perhaps (5) use private contract law to enforce privately
arranged settlements.2 Most importantly, Resnik envisions a "transparent independence" by which judges remain independent and do
not favor certain attorneys or types of cases, but instead obtain the
process they need in order to further the goals of the civil justice system.
The basic premise justifying Resnik's call for regulation appears to
be that aggregate litigation inherently creates conflicts of interest
which cannot be removed through other structural means and thus
must be regulated. To see why this might be so, consider an imaginary mass tort in which liability runs into the billions of dollars across
hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs, but in which injuries vary from
the trivial ($100), to the significant ($10,000), to the enormous
($1,000,000). A class containing all of these plaintiffs would suffer intra-class conflicts and a single lawyer could not provide adequate representation in a settlement. There would be large pressure upon the
lawyer to favor one set of claims over another in an effort to achieve a
settlement. Nor will subclassing by magnitude of injury end all chance
for collusion. Any one of the classes may threaten to impede settlement, unless paid a premium.
Finally, even a single class with complete homogeneity among its
members is not free of a risk of collusion between the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendants: if the size of the class is large enough, the
precise recovery for each plaintiff is submerged in the large aggregate
numbers which heavily influence the fee.24 Yet aggregate litigation invariably means that the true client is not able to audit the lawyer, and
the lawyers remain unaudited except for the court's supervision.
Without additional process and disclosure, Resnik's argument goes,
judges cannot set fees appropriately or determine the fairness of pro19 See i& at 2190-92.

SeeiUat 2190-91.

21See i& at 2192.

See i&at 2158-59.
2 1&at PartV.
24 See idL at 2168 ("[An 'enormous fee' can 'relax' the 'zeal for the client.'" (quoting 094, 119 S. Ct. at 2317 n.30)).
2
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posed settlements.
I agree with Professor Resnik's push for additional mandatory disclosure regarding side deals or any other agreements which indicate
collusion. After all, such disclosure would entail little additional cost.
I also think, however, that there are cheaper structural mechanisms
that treat collusion which do not require adding yet another layer of
lawyers and judicial oversight to the task of determining lawyers' fees.
Professor Resnik often states that the "economic value" of a settlement does not suffice as the sole proxy for determining how lawyers
should be compensated. While that sounds good-no one wants to
think that money is everything-I am not sure what a complete substitute would be. I think Resnik wants to capture the value that aggregate litigation provides to the civil justice system in her calculation. I
am not convinced of the relevance of this to setting attorney fees,
however. Every settlement (or case that leaves the system) also benefits the civil justice system in unmeasured ways, but we do not attempt
to capture those values in any measure.25 In other words, I am concerned about the cost of "additional process," and would strive to find
simple, cheaper methods which at least structurally would be fair and
still promote the values Resnik wants the civil justice system to possess.
Resnik's recommendations direct our attention to legitimate concerns, but the contingent fee or percentage of the common fund
method still has desirable qualities, both in its simplicity and because
it generally aligns incentives. At the same time, I would give less
weight to the amount of created "funds" and focus upon appropriate
compensation for skill, time, and risk, with risk meaning actual risk.
Fees should reflect the reality that few large sets of cases can be tried,
and that settlement is the only realistic means of resolution on an aggregated basis. The risk of zero payment is small. This blend ought to
better reflect the value of the attorney's service. The contingency fee
minimizes needless work and ensures aligned interests, at least as long
as a lawyer represents only a defined subclass which has
no intra-class
2
conflicts and is paid only from that subclass's recovery. 6
Collusion is preventable. We might consider disallowing settlements that involve multiple subclasses of plaintif and multiple defendants-in essence, mandated severance of subclasses after pretrial

2'

I put aside the reverse-a user fee imposed by the court upon counsel for pro-

viding the support, facilitating--even "brokering the deal." One wonders which way
the debt ought to run.
Unless, of course, the recovery is simply so large that zealous representation

evaporates. See supra note 24.
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discovery. In such circumstances, individual subclasses would not be
tried or settled in conjunction with other subclasses. Only during pretrial would the subclasses be treated as one, and that may be unnecessary to coordinated discovery.
Settlements would again be bipolar or move in that direction.
The result, however, would require that defendants negotiate multiple
settlements. Defendants might not obtain a "global" settlement if only
two of the three subclasses can be settled on their own. Of course, if
one of those classes cannot be settled, it may simply show a disparity
between the various valuations of what those claims are worth.
"Subclass severance" offers a smaller target to the objectors, except for limited fund cases. When defendants' resources are inadequate, subclasses may be at odds. That problem is not peculiar to aggregate litigation, although it is exacerbated by it. In that case, given
the present limits of Rule 23(b) (2), bankruptcy law must solve the
problem if for no better reason than its own accepted culture of
rough justice.
This said, I would not attempt to form rules of management for
trialjudges. The variety of the cases is large, and the variety ofjudicial
responses equally so. Ultimately there is no substitute for a trial
judge's hard look and, failing that, appellate intervention. The cold
reality is that most problems will be solved if the trial judge takes hold.
That does not include handing off the case to a magistrate judge with
occasional checks into its "progress." Nor can manuals and lists do
the job. The judicial role must expand with the relaxing of the adversary contest on request for approval of a settlement. That is the box
we put ourselves in as we move from the traditional roles of refereeing
bipolar cases.
Professor Resnik is troubled by the idea that lawyers for different
subclasses might receive different amounts under a scheme which
bases payments only on a percentage of the funds recovered. Yet, as
she accepts, paying all lawyers from the same fund reintroduces problems of collusion.
In her example, a Fen/Phen settlement might pay $30-$60 per
member to one set of claimants and hundreds of thousands of dollars
per member to another set of claimants.Y Unless we know the sizes of
these classes and the strength of their claims, however, it is not clear
that to apply a 20% recovery fee to both classes is inherently unfair.
The $30-$60 class might well be one thousand times larger than the

2

SeeResnik, supra note 1, at 2171.
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other class, and/or it might be a much easier class to settle. As such, I
am persuaded that the best solution is simply a contingent fee capped
by a judicial limit whereby the fee must in any event be reasonable
and the cap rests heavily upon the courts' assessment of the risks of
the case, its complexity, and the lawyer's creativity in response, as well
as the time and efforts required. This assumes that subclasses are
separately represented.
Subclassing and then deciding which lawyers are to represent
which subclass pose a more difficult problem. One might allow the
contending lawyers to bid. There may be other solutions as well.
III
The most important contributions of Professor Resnik's piece are
its implicit valuation of settlement as a desirable end to litigation and
its exemplar of creativity. After imagination has run free, we must anchor with a never changing goal-ensuring adequacy of representation. While Professor Resnik's piece is facially about attorneys' fees in
the context of aggregate litigation, the theme of adequate representation pervades throughout and adequate representation is the touchstone. As Resnik notes after discussing the fundamental problems of
aggregation, later summarized as "representational integrity and equitable distribution, "2 one possibility is that "judges could try to alleviate
the difficulties by offering only adjudication. " 9 That is not a bad
thing. A trial is no failure. Keep in mind that large aggregations of
cases can seldom be tried; that absent settlement, trials must be of
much smaller units. But settlements of aggregated cases remain possible and may be easier without class certification, putting aside consumer cases aggregated because the damages of a single class member
may notjustify a separate suit.
I return to where I began. Much of our difficulty is with the use of
private damage remedies to achieve regulatory compliance with
broadly stated norms. The aggregation of claims so changes the level
of enforcement that courts might consider invoking a form of the
doctrine of clear statement as a condition to such group resolution.
Equally, the judiciary must be aware in handling these cases that procedural mechanics, such as MDL treatment and class certification, are
not neutral forces; and that concentrations of control over large inventories of cases may be no more than the work of the market. Re-

29

I&at 2161.
See id at 2159.
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gardless, all are attended by large substantive consequences.
Courts are not probing adequacy of representation. Yet it is the
linchpin for all settlements. It follows that compensating counsel and
policing their conflicts are critical and interacting components. Relatedly, courts ought to be more cautious in accepting both the
claimed amount of the fund created and its role as a proxy of the
benefit conferred by the lawyers. This is prevalent in our legal culture
where lawyers are paid enormous fees as a percentage of recovery and
when the largest determinant of the level of the settlement or award is
not the counsel's work and skill, but rather the nature of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff. Accordingly, mechanical legal toleration of
private arrangements between lawyer and client ought not be the
practice. At the least, it has little place when the private attorney is
handed the mantle of private attorney general and has no direct relationship with the "client." We should not pay by the size of the herd
when the courts and natural terrain conducted the roundup.
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